


Jaime A. Maldonado



Art and Nothingness

Reflections about the Death of Art

CONFORMITY STATEMENT



The book that follows has been granted by me for reading only for public benefit. The original hardcopy book stated very clearly that it is forbidden to copy, publish or reproduce it by any means and by international law it is protected.

Now I have abandoned the idea of sell this book, but I have not given loose the benefit of being publicly recognized by those who want to read it.

Therefore, dear reader, you can download it from this Platform where I have put it and save it on your own computer, as long as you do not go to redistribute it.

Thank for your kind understanding!

Jaime A. Maldonado
jam@askdossier.com

ART AND NOTHINGNESS

Reflections about the death of Art

Jaime A. Maldonado

Edition 2012, English Version
Translated by Martin Philip Quartermaine

© 2012 Jaime A. Maldonado. English edition.
© 2012 Jaime A. Maldonado. First Spanish edition.

All Rights Reserved

No part of this book may be copied or reproduced
in any manner.

Inscripción N° 217.340 Ministerio de Economía.
Chile.

www. askdossier.com
ISBN 978-956-351-138-3

Printed at Editorial Dimacofi S.A.
Vitacura 2839, Santiago.
Printed in Chile

CONTENTS

Introduction	9
--------------	---

The Dilemma

The Mystic Village	15
The Idea of Death	40
<i>In diebus illis...</i>	45

A Beautiful Seduction

<i>Artifact and enaction</i>	49
The significant immanence	53
Beauty as fundamental of art	63

Finis

The Limits	79
Transfiguration <i>In extremis</i>	87
Consciousness as a Power of Transfiguration	97
Enaction as a Power of Transfiguration	103

<i>Postfacio</i>	107
------------------	-----

REFERENCES	111
------------	-----

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My most sincere thanks to the people, who have in their own time, helped by reading and making numerous and helpful observations, with a special mention of Ignacio Garretón, Jorge Gómez, Julio Zumaeta y Orlando Ruiz. I would also like to thank Martin P. Quartermaine for his patience and with whom we have spent much time searching for the right wording to describe the logical complexities of this work. Many thanks to Marcela Vidal, Ph.D., with whom I had several conversations, all of which helped me clarify the referred concepts of evolutionary theories; Many thanks to my brother Félix as his criticism has allowed me to see with greater clarity the path towards which this book was leading.

JAM

Introduction

When one invokes the word “art”, one usually thinks of European oil paintings yet when one witnesses “performance art” (as it tends to be called these days), one is soon wondering, what has happened, has art died? And before long one has returned to the great question: What is Art?

In the world of the late Middle Ages, the fine arts (paintings, sculptures, music, poetry, dance, theatre, etc.) mainly in Europe, started a process of secularisation as if their *raison d’être*, as eternal imagery for divine cults and the powers of state, was being transformed, whereby this imagery increasingly began to represent the human experience and also become more varied and abundant. But for this to happen an extraordinary transformation had to have occurred, one that challenged all the existant theories that had been

elaborated: the artists started to abandon their trade and their manual or psychomotor skills, to produce “works of art” from heterogeneous objects, that were assembled by removing them from their original contexts; this new fashion became “modern art”. This was critical in producing a schism in the paradigms, that the concept, theory and philosophy of art had up until that moment, been rooted. This transformation has been of such magnitude, that it has generated confusion and disheartenment, and some thinkers have asserted that this has resulted in the death of art. In the Age of the Enlightenment, art had been so imbued with the principle of beauty, that it was considered benign; but in the new modernism, to create a consistency within the postulated theory of art, beauty as the fundamental motif of art was eliminated, as it conflicted with many of the ignoble materials or unseemly stories, that were being used for works of “modern art” and as a consequence, the essence of art theory that had been in vogue, was no longer of use to explain its own foundations.

In these reflections, I intend to clarify this paradox, to reclaim beauty as the essential element within all human experience, in ways such that it is generated and perceived as a pleasurable sensation by the cognoscente subject.

My conception of beauty is the fundamental theory to explain with just one idea, what are “fine arts”, “modern art”, craftsmanship and many other forms

of human imagery and, additionally, within a sphere where it has never been appreciated: scientific discovery; and so attain a global aesthetics, where beauty is connected to knowledge.

And what of the death and supposed agelessness of art? It would be as well to concentrate on the limits which define Art, in all of its manifestations, and find the origin of this species of contradiction, this equality of contrary conclusions; and so we get to Hegel with his philosophical phrase, which has become an historical phrase, which many have clung to, in order to assert that art, finally, had come to an end, a terminal state. We should note that in Spanish as in English, exists the double-meaning of end and finality (*fin* and *finalidad*); some coincidence! End can mean the same as finality, but it can also mean the same as death; however finality is not the same as death and therein lies the confusion. In effect, Hegel conceives of dialectic transformations with a specific purpose, that which imposes a hidden determinism; on the margin of which, is a forced interpretation of that historic sentence (no longer philosophical) in which “we no longer have any need to expose the content of the art form. For us art is and remains, in keeping with its supreme destiny, a thing of the past”, a proposal, extracted with tweezers from its dialectic meaning (Hegel, 2011, p. 13, 14), in which it seems to indicate that Hegel is telling us of a transformation, a diversion

from the objective of art as a messenger or carrier of the content; but not as the predictor of its death. In effect, Hegel, within the same “Lectures on Aesthetics” from where the sentence was quoted, says already in the Introduction, in the third paragraph, “The Finality of Art”, he says: “The question now arises of the interest, the reason by which Man attempts to materialise his concepts of his subject-content (that which is contained) through the medium of works of art”. If one studies in fine detail this sentence, the idea that stands out is the “medium that contains”, given that Hegel is exhaustive in his work to affirm that, within the medium of all artistic disciplines, *inside* the medium, the subject-content is firmly anchored. But by what rules has Hegel permitted himself to presume this idea? Why does one have to assume that the medium has to be a container? Because the container and the contents are both necessary. For the moment, I feel obliged to add and qualify the last sentence by saying “the medium *can* contain”; I will take the opportunity later in these reflections to expand this idea. On the other hand, Heidegger, in reference to the same historical sentence, prefers to ask “Is art still a special and vital means, through which the truth, that defines us and our historical existence, is conveyed or is this no longer so?”

For his part, Gadamer refers to the “doctrine of the ‘character of the past’ ”, quoting Hegel, he talks about aesthetics (Gadamer, 2010, p. 33), given that Hegel was referring to the “old art”, adding that

Hegel didn't consider that the "age of historicity" had begun, in which art would come to claim its own true nature. I might add to the words of Gadamer: Art is looking at itself introspectively, as if it exists for itself, as if it were trying to find out what it is and what it does and what it should do, its conscience of being appearing in this way in the history of art, through, of course, the actions of the artists and thinking for itself through the artists. Note how easily one can talk of art as if it were an entity, however it is a word: "art" not "Art". When "Art" looks at itself, being conscious of itself, it takes on the idea of a mortal, fleeting entity.

Finally, it is necessary to unravel from the historical sentence and Heidegger's comments what is referred to as the truth. The truth is the Derridean "truth in painting" (Derrida, 2010), about which one has to include all types of art, those *de facto* and those that are not yet conceived and not just those that lie in the frame of a painting. And especially, in my judgement, it is that truth, that is perceived by the consensus of constant human interaction, sharing and disseminating knowledge. That truth is for me, the collective consensus. The Derridean truth is that which is perceived within the frame of the painting, where the painting has a place to exist. (Note: the painting as a form of art, not "Art", as a universal and necessary entity). When I place the truth as a consensual perception, I would like to draw attention to the nature of being human, because "Art" is transcendent, in my

judgement, it is part of our vertebrate genetical makeup, a theme that is a subject beyond the content of the primal question that I have proposed, referring to our philosophical existence.

The Dilemma

The Mystic Village

When one wishes to theorise about art and determine if a specific work is art or not, one finds oneself with two disjointed premises: one says that art is a historical issue, dealing with objects of beauty and permeated by the soul and the human spirit; the other says that anything is art and beauty is not necessary. So, the purpose of these reflections, is to discover whether art has the elements of necessity and universality, if it transcends our contingent experiences, or was just a good idea, that occurred to someone; consequently to finish with a reflection about the existence of art and the death of art; especially if this latter was about to occur.

To my way of thinking, philosophy shouldn't ignore who we are as beings, our natural history; a situation that has existed like a taboo, and in which the theories have never been incorporated (I will return to this idea at the end of this chapter).

It seems that "Art" doesn't exist, in so much as: "Art is for the moment a word, which doesn't correspond to reality" (Heidegger, 2001). It is like the Tao that is defined in its being, the Tao is: it is everything and nothing at the same time and changes over time. So Art would depend on the works and the artists, but also on those who appreciate it (something that Heidegger does not mention). From this arises another question, which may be more primordial: does Art, like life, have a non-existence? Does it have a lifespan with a finite knowable limit? Or more crudely: has Art died or is it already dying?

Even today, we nostalgically think of art as a thing of beauty. I think many people believe this, and believe that the contemporary artists have gone mad or become deranged through isolation and are producing works without beauty. Athenian art from the 5th century B.C. was without doubt filled with beauty. Hegel used it as an example to illustrate the degree of contentedness and well-being among the people, who lived in that place and time. This is as it should be in his historicist vision, with his determinism and concept of a hidden lineal dimension.

This question is entirely valid for our times, when so many unattractive works of art are being produced.

My opinion is that no part of this dark panorama is true; but that there is confusion and that we are judging the wrong objects, attributing properties to them that they do not possess.

Art has manifested itself ever since the human race began; however, to try and be more precise, it was not just *Homo sapiens*. Modern archaeology has discovered innumerable expressions of effects on materials, which in the remote past, were given shape or form that evoked something more than just simply geometrical lines. I refer, for example, to the Venus de Brassenpouy effigies, made from mammoth ivory from around 25,000 years ago, or the Chauvet-Pont-d'Arc Caves, that contain expressive paintings of animals, made about 30,000 years ago; and even before that, 60,000 years ago, early humans were building ritual huts, making tools. The so-called "Mousterian Culture" was associated primarily with *Homo neanderthalensis*, a species very similar to *Homo sapiens*. The caves of Lascaux and Altamira have beautiful paintings, which were made by Cro-Magnon *Homo sapiens* about 15,000 years ago. However the Neanderthals had already left traces of their artistic capacities tens of thousands of years earlier in the Paleolithic Age. Since then, there have been 2,000 generations

of hominids, among whom were the Neanderthals, Cro-Magnons and of course modern Man.

What is the difference? Did someone invent art or is it a vital impulse, an *élan* that has been integral to vertebrates since the remotest epochs? And as such where does the story of art begin? From what basic principle did the idea that art is European come from? Is art made up of the arbitrary group of five arts (painting, poetry, music, architecture and sculpture) that Hegel selected? I believe that the Story of Art has not been written yet. We have hardly experimented with more than a handful of styles, which the art critics like to measure together as if that is all that is “Art”, starting with the Middle Ages and finishing abruptly at the end of the 19th century, when Modernism threw out all the previous theories of art.

As a consequence, I have here my central idea: the Story of Art started as a biological response, an adaptive response by our ancestors to the challenges of nature.

I have no wish to dig around and find the exact day it all started, but I might just suggest that the Story of Art is the History of the Human species, as it evolved from the smallest groups of individuals, trying to survive in ever increasing populations.

I will start, somewhat arbitrarily, with the Neanderthal hominids, who formed small family

clans and lived in caves 100,000 years ago. It is interesting to remember that there have been 4,000 generations since then and this is a sufficient number of generations to have enabled genetic mutations to have occurred.

These hominids survived by hunting and gathering wild fruits and vegetables and they had the skills to make tools and create shelters.

Even then, every object was owned; this custom of ownership is what has differentiated us from our most primitive ape ancestors, who lived in the trees and forests. It is true that primates, in general, manufactured tools, but apes (*Pan*) did not mark them to claim ownership, as humans (*Homo*) have done to the present day.

The way towards the present has been through 2,000 generations, 2,000 experimental stages, in which evolutionary skills have developed so each generation learnt to avoid being killed by predators, dying of hunger, losing themselves in the jungle or being drowned in the swamps. The skills, needed to make tools that were effective and useful to the individual and the tribe, survived. These skills were necessary so that the tribe as a whole could work together and coordinate as a group, even when they had ventured on to strange lands, so that they could find food and safety. The way, since the Neanderthals, passing through the Cro-Magnons and arriving at modern humans, has

been perilous for most generations. It has been discovered that these ancestors built ritual shelters and did not crowd together in large populations like we do now. It seems that this coordinated work within small groups of individuals allowed the tribes to adapt well in the natural ecosystem where they lived. In this way, the species' population increased. This is despite facing years when the hunting was sparse, when gathering fruits and vegetables without cultivating them, was difficult. These ancestors faced different problems: they needed to be better and more persistent explorers. Their social way of life became more intensive, because there was more competition to find food, which was insufficient to share with unknown tribes. This tendency to intensify the social way of life enabled safer and more stable conditions for the community. It also enabled them to acquire mystical or divine experiences, which helped them to be more audacious and face the uncertainties of the unknown.

Spoken language was vital to facilitate the adaptation of the species and strengthen the community in its struggles, as it allowed the individual to incorporate the experiences of others to resolve problems and also allowed him to increase his awareness of the unknown, to explore, which is one of the main characteristics of being human.

The ethologist, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, in one of his essays, observed that:

“The ‘rationalisation’ of evolution –in the true sense of the word- is only reached in man with the development of speech and writing. Both give us a certain degree of independence from the laborious mechanism of mutation and selection”

(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970)

This idea connects with my thesis in the sense that there is a point in the phylogenetics, in which humans begin to reflect on certain questions, which were no longer just about survival. Up until this point had there been a need for reflective thought? The humans at this stage of our history had been differentiated from more primitive hominids due to their need to explore and as a group visualise hypothetical future scenarios.

In the Walt Disney film “The Lion King”, at sunset after a hard day’s night, a wild boar called Pumbaa and a meercat called Timon, carry on this following dialogue while they contemplate the stars:

Pumbaa : Hey, Timon, ever wonder what those sparkly dots are up there?

Timon : Pumbaa, I don't wonder; I know.

Pumbaa : Oh what are they?

Timon : They're fireflies. Fireflies that, uh... got stuck up on that big bluish-black thing.

Pumbaa : Oh, gee. I always thought they were balls of gas burning billions of miles away

This scene suggests to me that no animal more primitive than *Homo sapiens* –in those circumstances- has ever sat down and thought of anything so strange. It is funny if one wonders what good would it do them. And so I think, in the case of humans, that it comes from the need to explore and visualise future hypothetical situations.

Back in the time of Neanderthal man, brave, imaginative beings, with mystique and group sense, ornamented the Caves of Chauvet, when there would still be more than a thousand more generations, a thousand more experiments Nature would be carrying out, and each one would have its share of frightened people who died, cripples who could not leave the jungle, the clumsy ones who sank in the swamps; in the meantime the creative ones, those that were in tune with Nature, who understood its signs, became the chosen forefathers to bequeath their Genetic Heritage to their descendants .

And so was born what I will call the Mystic Village.

That small, undivided, dedicated group waiting tensely, intimately for the prey, in the black of

night, with a shared mystical union, as they communed together through dialogue and sign language to unravel the problems that daily cooperation created.

The principal differences between the primitive hominids and those who settled in these mystical villages, is that the latter lived in crude shelters instead of living in the open, completely exposed to Nature. They had some community structures and were able to modify their environment, to create what could be called a basic architecture. They had language, but were *without writing*¹; they were gatherers of wild foods, and many of these foods were cooked; they designated ownership and identity to the tools they fabricated, at least they made marks or imprints on them and they related divine powers to their daily struggles.

The more primitive peoples however had no economic system, as they consumed what they had collected, without any specific idea of distribution. On the other hand the village people developed an economy based on an equitable distribution and the use of basic agricultural techniques.

¹ Lévi-Strauss referred to the “*societies without writing*” (“*ágrafas*” in Spanish) meaning those that had no system of writing, but who explained their world through myth and magic (Lévi-Strauss, 1987, Cap 2)

For their part, the primitives connected instinctively with each other, which allowed them to function as a unit within colonies, although these first humans were atheist. In the Mystic Village, however, a strong sense of identity was created, probably strengthened by a more complex language, and supported by their conception of a cosmogony, (ornamental objects have been discovered, which have been marked with their specific deific imprint), all of which enabled them to become theists.

The Mystic Village was beauty incarnate by Man, its art was unique and immanent; it was imprinted on all of their possessions, an art that allowed them to share their imagination, as in the Caves of Chauvet, using wonderful paintings where it seems like they had seen bison, horses and birds running and flying; where they must have imagined unknown worlds, trembling with fear, waiting for a better day.

At these stages in Man's evolution, there were the symbolic and communicative words found in their actions as the written word was not yet necessary, as Claude Lévi- Strauss explained in "The Raw and the Cooked" (Lévi-Strauss, 2002). Some human tried the food after he had cooked it, and so he needed to communicate his discovery about cooked food and the concept of cooking it; however without being able to compare this experience, he also had to conceive of other new ideas, that of raw

food, food preparation as well as cooking, etc. connecting things which were part of his natural world.

It makes us wonder if by any chance evolution passed a point of splendour with these groups of beings, so perfectly connected to their environment without destroying one petal more than was necessary, in an equilibrium of life and within a permanent, coherent and divine relationship with nature.

Surely in their hours of loneliness or vigil, they would have imagined divinities also. What matter if they invented their gods, as so long as their minds and bodies vibrated with just one melody². And in effect the myth or even *whatever they wished to create*, guaranteed a complete coherence with their environment.

However this prosperous, evolutionary solid state, stable and finely tuned to their environment enabled the population to increase, and brought in its train the brute force of change.

² Jacob von Uexküll elaborated a biological theory with a metaphor about contact of beings with nature, stating that it was like a musical harmony (a kind of teleology); he imagined all beings in the biosphere playing a melody, representing a vital part within a great orchestrated plan. (Uexküll, 1926).

Then the Mystic Villages multiplied and became larger communities, becoming targets of envy from other groups, who desired what the villages had gathered, produced and cultivated as a result of their communal effort and work.

In effect, while the Genetic Heritage was based on the dynamic of the generational changes (it is for this reason that I put so much emphasis in referring to the number of generations that have passed, rather than the thousands of years), the human intellect and its influence on the relationship with the environment, developed faster, so much so that a lag was produced between the physical body's and the human intellect's adaptations to their environment.

The body needs to adapt itself mechanically, while the intellect, in virtue of its capacity to imagine future hypothetical scenarios, creates needs which are not universal, since the imagination is not a response by the species to its environment, rather it is a response by the individual in particular.

Population growth made a dramatic impact on the behaviour of the people as the villages grew to become towns and cities, where they became a denser urban mass, where it was difficult to sustain the affective bonds and the group self-discipline, which were inherited from the Mystic Village. The great city allowed anonymity and humans learnt to be crafty as with present-day man. The first cities,

the *polis*, appeared about 20,000 years ago, Eridu and Uruk in Mesopotamia.

In Africa, the process was much slower, and even today Mystic Villages persist there. And with respect to America, as the first hominids to arrive there were already modern *Homo sapiens*, the first cities only began to flourish at the same period of time as the European invasion of America, and these Europeans rapidly destroyed them.

The death of the Mystic Village was the compost out of which flourished the metropolis, and hence the nation, and to the Genetic Heritage was added the Heritage of Glory, these communities of humans, who had achieved merit by working together for the common weal.

I take the idea of the Heritage of Glory of the Nation from the concept that Ernest Renan proposed in a conference given at the Sorbonne in 1882 (Renan, 2010).

The Chinese thinker Lao Tzu, some 2,500 years ago, made a plea to the mandarins of his time, telling them:

“Let the people be mindful of death so that they don’t move too far from their birthplaces”

...

“Let the people use knotting strings again

*and use then instead of writing*³”

(Lao Tzu, 2004, Ch.80)

Lao Tzu longed for a return to the Mystic Village. He feared that the vortex of these great cities would cause deep unrest. However the city did not have to be just a large village, but it also needed to expand its Heritage of Glory, so that it could become a Mystic-Imperial State, where it was necessary to impose and subjugate the villagers. It required, therefore, a theory of subjugation, in order to justify the subjection of the people. The Heritage of Glory of the city would aim to leave its imprint and it will materialize in writings to be transmitted from generation to generation, which I will call the “Enlightened Heritage”.

The differences between the Mystical-Imperial State and the Mystic Villages are basically the following: There is more intense intervention within the habitat, forming clusters of residences with shared services, like the provision of water, roads, protective walls, a standing military, a shared cosmological belief. As well as these there was a body of scientific learning, from which an astronomical understanding could develop;

³ The knotted string was used for arithmetical tasks, which custom was supposedly transmitted to the Incaic Empire in America, where they were called “*quipus*”.

philosophy, science and scriptures are established as fundamental elements to benefit the community as a whole; the production and distribution of food is more elaborate given that much greater quantities are needed; one or more religions arise to legislate and control the access to the divine elements; their tools are more complex and more varied, including weapons; economic activity begins to take advantage of economies of scale, although there are only marginal benefits to the community, since the empire accumulates these profits (in most modern Western nations, the profits of economies of scale are kept by the traders who manage the business; or in other words there is a free market, whereby the profits go to specific individuals). Up to this point, the cities are still mainly agrarian; with regard to the “citizens”, their small, close-knit clans are diluted as individuals become subjected to imperial demands and they get ordered into a more complex hierarchical social structure.

The Buddha preached his wisdom after a long state of meditation as did Jesus Christ, who disappeared for many years before he began to preach.

The appearance of “prophets” could not have occurred in a different stage of human phylogeny. In those days, there were many hermits, who needed to be far from the human masses and were never found in the great cities. As we know, Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Deleuze, etc., did not need to be isolated to such an extreme in order to formulate

their concepts, which make up much of our current knowledge: in fact their discoveries were irrelevant before the advent of the great city (also true for today). Anyway, this phenomenon would never have happened in the Mystic Village, as it was not necessary, there was no major conflict or rebellion, there was no need of a science of law, nor even less need for promises of a life after death: the Mystic Village was Human Life.

In those days, the broken and displaced god of the Mystic Village had to be replaced and there had to be a foundation to replace it, since the State needed to establish a *Magna Carta*, which would incorporate the Heritage of Glory for the rest of time. (Note that the Heritage of Glory is specific only for those subjects of a particular state). The Judaeo-Christian religion was jostling for a foothold in those days; the existential foundation of this great mass of humanity, who lived in a community, had produced some of the most brilliant thinkers, like Lao Tzu, Confucius, Zoroaster, Heraclite, Socrates, Aristotle and others. None of these could have existed in the Mystic Village, not because the inhabitants were intellectually inferior to us, but because philosophy would be nonsense there, it would have been a loss of unification and harmony of the being with his environment, with Nature. Philosophers have tried to discover the theoretical signs of the environment through reflection. But the Mystic Villagers were bound to the environment by daily contact through their skin,

through trial and error processes, and their biological adequacy (fitness). The cited thinkers, in my judgement, were vital for the foundation of states, in order to contain the unrest fomented within the urban masses, which could have caused these states to self-destruct. And...who believes that they didn't self-destruct anyway?

Almost all of the ideas that the first thinkers created pointed at the moral issues and the struggles for power. Definitively those thinkers had to have been those who created what I will call the Enlightened Heritage, who provided the "knowledge" (allow me to use quotation marks) for all the adjacent states and for all time to come. Take note that the Enlightened Heritage does not originate from the Mystic Villages; their history wasn't lineal, there was no end of time for them, no purpose, and no promised heaven. The Villager (in a positive sense: the inhabitant of the Mystic Village) has no conflict with nature, because he *is* Nature; so there is no death or ending to the story, but more like a Nietzschean eternal recurrence. But the Mystical-Imperial State is its antithesis: its story is lineal, there is a purpose and a promise of heaven, the citizen is in conflict with nature, it prophesises the end of time and is abeyant to a higher purpose. But in exchange for what did the subjects want to belong to this State, if not for this assertive paradigm shift? Philosophy has given excellent support through hermeneutics, which is the logic of the Enlightened Heritage.

It is important to point out that these states had a need for art, in order to achieve the aim of promoting the benefits of the empire and to “see” with clarity the truth to which the empire laid claim and to visualise the deities and gods, that were not seen, except through telluric phenomena. So as a consequence underneath the immediate façade of an art object, symbols were added, so that the art could fulfil the states’ ultimate purpose as it had been used for centuries.

The artists would show Laocoön, Apollo, Vishnu, dragons, angels and demons. Similar types of state were established in Greece, Constantinople, India, Indonesia, Rome, Australasia and many other places. However some thousand or so years ago, the Mystical-Imperial State showed signs of decadence (notice how fast this happened: within the time span of no more than 100 generations), implying there was a strong lag between genetic development with its instinctive association with the environment and the priorities with respect to the paradigms of the Enlightened Heritage.

This lag I will call the **atavistic breach** ⁴, which hides a brute force, present from the beginning, where the Genetic Heritage is dissatisfied with the

⁴ The atavistic breach is the conflict between real power and the need to be an integral part of the biosphere.

behaviour induced by the Enlightened Heritage.

The States needed theological principles and a rule of law whose foundation rested, even today, on the assertion that it provided a visible way for all subjects to progress towards the future and beyond. It had to destroy disconformity, which coincides with Nietzsche's views. The natural intuition of the primitive Mystic Villager had to be replaced with plausible purposes in life, which could be expressed through language, although I do not coincide in my views with the nihilistic Nietzschean doctrine, due to the lag (the atavistic breach) between the Genetic Heritage, which has essentially been static over the last 200 generations with respect to the Enlightened Heritage, which on the other hand had been far from static, having spread its influence over all humanity through globalisation and which has made us subject to constant change from the real religious and political power. This soon became firmly established, for example (without being exhaustive) through the concept of "progress", and a *becoming* (in the sense of transformation as a metaphysical concept), an historical linearity, concepts which would have been impossible in the Mystic Village. From early on, thinkers, established fundamental ideas which were too dependant on scientific method, (somewhat randomly) which depended on the processes of discovery and how to make the observations coherent with a theoretical *becoming*, which, I believe, is impossible. The thinkers had told their

subjects that they had a free conscience, that they were not being spied upon, that it was their right to use their wits for their own benefits, that all the millions of members of the state were equal, that life was ephemeral. In this way the Mystical-Imperial State disconnected itself from all divine experience and for their part the artists became orphaned from religions. It is enough to read Nietzsche to get a deeper angle on this issue. Barely 300 years ago (only 12 generations!), the Enlightenment again fomented the brute force of change when Kant concluded that Man had reached maturity and exclaimed: *Sapere aude!* Dare to be wise! (Kant, 2007 “Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” Ak. VIII 35).

He means to say that history has a beginning! Could it then mean that it has a death or could it be in its death throes right now?

The question is why reflexive thought, as a provider of intelligence, formulation of future hypothetical scenarios, myths etc., is able to generate the *atavistic breach* between Genetic Heritage and the Enlightened Heritage. The divergence in the phylogenetic drift can be quantified by measuring this breach with ethological indicators of a human specie's (in this case, *Homo sapiens*) behaviour.

I will cite an example of this ethologically quantifiable breach: Desmond Morris made a point

of noting that humans hide their sex, adding that exposing it and touching it would cross a line of intimacy that could be seen as sexual violation (Morris, 2004 Ch. 2, p. 94). Man is the only animal who wears a loincloth. He must have sex, because he is *genetically* programmed to do so, but he must limit this urge because he is a civilized being (enlightened). Having sex frequently allows him to be at one with nature, however not having sex, generates a need to satisfy this natural urge, and no sex at all could lead to his extinction.

Metaphysical knowledge grew out of the Mystical-Imperial State. This knowledge generated concepts (freedom, progress, *becoming*, the end of the species) that cried out for a science that could provide functionality and then in turn these concepts cried out for tools⁵ to resolve their problems.

But of what use would these concepts be?

On the other hand, the structural transformations of the species (i.e., those that are strictly biological) occur consistently with the connection with the biosphere and natural selection through mutations that ultimately we observe as changes in the

⁵ A stock of lots of different tools (hammers, coffee-makers, spacecraft, UNIX, condoms, NASDAQ, burial vaults, etc.).

structure of the individual members of the same species (skin, hair, eye colour, sleight of hand, disease resistance, etc..). There is "progress" if they meet the specie's needs and but on the other hand, there is a "decline" if they are not met at all or they produce new needs, as a consequence of which in the latter situation, can lead to the specie's extinction. From this the behaviour of the species is moulded, the *Dasein*, the being as it is in that circumstance.

Until the appearance of the Mystic Village, that connection was in harmony with the biosphere, in the sense that structural changes of the species were in harmony with structural changes in the biosphere, in the sphere of the phenomena of life, as its *Umwelt* ⁶ or the habitat where the species confronts this transformation process. But then, due to the tangle of 1) the metaphysical concepts, 2) the functions which science uses to connect the concepts and 3) the implementation of the useful and the useable, the atavistic breach appears, the consistency is missing, and neither the problems nor the solutions can compensate for the structural adjustments.

⁶ Jacob von Uexküll defined the habitat of an animal as *umwelt* within which it communicates through its significant interactions (Uexküll, 1926).

The problems themselves will be designated as either potential problems, as problems *a priori*, needing fixing tools that were originally conceived as metaphysical concepts, or metaphysical problems, which are not conditioned by existential needs (eating, avoiding predators, etc.), but by questions like how will my economic stability be jeopardised, or my social security, my social recognition and ultimately my physical comfort.

(Philosophy is clear that genetic change is possible only through biochemical processes).

So for example, it is necessary to create the functions (scientifically derived functions i.e. by physicists, biologists, anthropologists, psychologists, doctors, etc.) to explain why we act as we do and how we can rediscover that mystical foundation so vital to the Mystic Village that the modern world has lost, the step from *mitos* to the Gadamerian *logos*, from which arise concepts like *progressus ad finitum* (Croce, 1906, pp. 199-200), and all of its theoretical consequences and the tools (as in this example, religion) that humans use to understand their concept of progress or *their becoming* (the latter is being used as a metaphysical concept, somewhat like an artifice where humans speculate about their future and the end of humanity).

It is probably at this stage where a written language becomes “necessary”, so that an idea may persist beyond the simple act of sharing a thought. Even

though the written word seems more real than the spoken word, probably due to its relative permanence and even though it seems it is rigid, in that the written word does not contradict or stutter, it remains as it was written, unless the document is destroyed, but instead the spoken words are hesitant, inaccurate, fade, and those who forget them, cannot review, verify, compare them and also they are usually accompanied by corporeal expressions with subtle meanings (Merlau-Ponty, 1997, *"The Body"*). From this I deduce then, that written language is another metaphysical concept, at least in regard to its veracity.

At the beginning of this chapter I said that thinkers should not treat the natural history of man as a species as taboo; in fact, German Idealism, especially Kant, put a limit, a fence around biological humanity with his doctrine of transcendental thought, which called for us to create a mental separation of the biological phenomenon from the phenomena that originated from the thinking being and his powers of thinking; however I believe we should ask why these powers are necessary to man's existence as a species.

As a consequence, this separation ends by creating a veto or prohibition, an impediment to arrive at a conclusion, as if by crossing over to include all the phenomena, we may threaten those paradigms, which by their frailty, could upset the balances

inherent in the Enlightened Heritage; almost as if we prohibit by law human rights or free thought.

There seems to be a fear, a mental panic of ideas that could be considered harmful, risky. Taboo is fear and requires an act of authority to command that a wall should be built and set a limit around where there should be none, encircling knowledge. It is as if a myth were threatening that authority.

The problem appeared in the Mystical-Imperial State in an attempt to preserve the logical integrity of the Enlightened Heritage, because if it was not a necessity that had to do with being human, it was a superstition, unbridled faith. To deconstruct the taboo of the natural history of man, we must identify the hidden and protected myth that it concealed.

I would say there are three veils or suppressions: first is the distance that philosophy wants to maintain with respect to science. Philosophy wants to go towards metaphysics and it uses science when this latter reaches apodictic certainty. Science for its part is investigating the causal characteristics of matter within the paradigm that matter is finite in its diversity, so that someday science may reach an absolute understanding of it.

Secondly is the folly that we are superior to all other living beings due to the spirit, the *super*, which is like a mask hiding a face, this veil of

superiority hides our mythical essence, it is the Noah returned to save the biosphere, but disrupting the delicate equilibrium.

Thirdly, the Judeo-Christian tradition (de)limited the origins of humanity and created the most solid wall known.

Under these lines lies the real historicity of art and from here one can deduce a history of art, a topic beyond the scope of these reflections, for which reason I think I'll leave it here.

The Idea of Death

When I reflect on death, I cannot help but think about the contradiction of this idea with the natural history of our species, we humans have always been like this, we have since time began, manifested expressions that fall into the category of art, so how could art die if we do not die first?

Benedetto Croce did not admit that art had even had a primitive origin, but in his discourse, he implied that some race of people invented it.

This is therefore one side of the dilemma of what art is.

Many people have believed that Hegel declared the death of art assuming that he always spoke of art as completed, as a doctrine of the past. Not everyone has really understood the meaning of his words.

Hegel thought of the idea of *becoming* from a dialectical point of view and he focused his interest strictly on *the idea*, not the form or the content of art.

His perception was that the process of humanity's *becoming* converged towards perfection, a linear story, unending and non-repetitive, as proposed by Sartre and in that sense one could accept that a death would be inevitable.

Hegel's ideal was Athenian art and he reflected by saying that artists of his day no longer referred to the great heroes or gods, the aspirations of the people. However he believed in and appreciated the Dutch art of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, given that the artists of this genre tried to represent things or ideas that were not perceived in everyday life but which were represented with beautiful clarity.

And so on, this has been happening again and again over the years, so we can no longer keep saying that art has died again, just because it does not represent heroes or gods, or the essences of things, or worse even, because it no longer is in

keeping with the values that we hold today of life on Earth, etc.

The content, which is represented, I should say "the symbolic content", is not part of the essence of Art. It is not necessary, philosophically, to embed symbols in an object of art. This will always change, and when humans, say in the thirtieth century, want to represent stellar effects or microcosmic phenomena or whatever, must we declare that Art has died again? (I hasten to say that I consider the broad Cassirerian sense of "symbol", without discriminating between symbols, signs and signals).

In short, Hegel not only does he *not* announce the death of art, but he believes there is an ultimate purpose of the spirit, which may sound extravagant to us, but we should consider that he believed that there is a historical becoming that is not random, but is directed towards perfection.

In the "Lectures on Aesthetics" (taking note that he did not edit them), he argues specifically in the section "Zweck der Kunst" ("The Aim of Art")*: "Now the question arises of what interest or *end*

* **Translator's Note:** The author originally referenced Hegel's quotation from the Spanish translation of his work which is entitled: "Fin del arte".

man sets before himself when he produces such subject-matter in the form of works of art" (Hegel, 1975, Introduction, III, A, 3). As shown, there is no difficulty in distinguishing between purpose and death, between looking for

the end of a sequence as an entity and the death of that entity or its disintegration.

Moreover, art can contain symbols and represent ideas: what one *sees* in its immediate form as the envelope is what it contains. If one day the post office (*Corlieu*) decides to change the shape and colour of the envelopes, it will not affect the letters they carry. It would be a transfiguration of the postal system, but not a death.

It is true that Hegel warned about a transfiguration of the congruence of art with the human element, a limit: *Auflösung* as dissolution-resolution (Formaggio, 1992), we could say transfiguration, but not death: *Vernichtung*. This leads to what Gadamer qualified as the character of the past, given that Hegel's reference is the old (as opposed to modern) art (I will return to this below).

Rather I think that was the reason for the transformations. The ancient Chinese thinkers conceived of "being" in a different light from those of the West. Lao Tzu explained it like this:

"All the things under the Heaven, born of being

Being is born of non-being".

(Lao Tzu, 1995, Ch. 40)

I argue that art can always represent something, including the representation of nothing, because the non-representation is something either not shown or not there, or it contains the sign "empty"; this is definitely the case of abstract painting.

I have an antique pottery jar, arranged on a table, I have never used it to contain any liquid, but this jar sits there empty and its emptiness makes sense to me.

Hegel never imagined that one day that there would be a painting without symbols nor content. But this took place in Russia in 1915, when Kasimir S. Malevich exhibited an oil painting of 79.5 x79.5 cm, showing a black square on a white background, entitled "Black Square on White". It is currently considered a valuable work of art that is found in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow. It is for me the perfect work of non-representation; just like a dodecaphonic piece of music, which tries not to have any melody or rhythm, it is a complex work, which is not nothing, but only non-representation, as valid as the Madonnas of Rubens or any other paintings that are non-Madonnas just because they do not have them, or the non-Meninas or the non-Guernicas.

Hegel never could have imagined an annihilation of art or an historical end to it, nor was he explicit about anything like this.

In diebus illis...

There is a metanarrative or a very influential great narrative that has not yet been adequately deconstructed. How valid can a scattered set of theories be if we cannot find the backbone that legitimates them? This, then, is the other side of the dilemma.

So how can one talk about the death of Art, without discovering the truth about the origin of Art? How does something cease to exist if it never existed? How can it die without living?

In reviewing what has been solemnly written in the rhetorical writings on art, from the oldest known to contemporary literature, there is surprising confusion. "The writings say ..." is like saying here's the central problem (*busilis*), which is an ancient philological problem, which arose from the Catholic masses that were read in Latin; the lesson was read starting with "In diebus illis ..." ⁷, which someone

⁷ "In those days"

transcribed as "In die busillis ...", inventing the word *busilis* which now means the crux of the problem.

It was a misunderstanding about how the narrative would proceed. This is how we have understood Art, it is plausible that our story comes to us from our Enlightened Heritage, and we have become convinced by it despite its irrationality, letting ourselves get carried away by the thrill of its so called wisdom whereby its charm and its disturbing beauty makes us impressionable and clouds our reason, preventing us from thinking straight. One day someone should do a survey of art literature, to find out exactly how many adjectives are used in each discipline. I am convinced that within the disciplines of theory and philosophy of art are found the most adjectives, allegories, pleonasms, dithyrambs and digressions, something which does not occur in mathematics, astronomy, economics, or even psychology.

Talking about art inebriates us; it drives us on to Dionysian climaxes. Hence my suspicion that what is said about philosophical and art theory contains too many assumptions, too many paradigms; too much avoidance of the questions, too disconnected with man's natural history and too drunk and hallucinated by the works themselves, about which Kant, in his first criticism, called a spurious attempt to get to the basic foundations from a superficial empirical viewpoint, therefore he did not share the

aesthetic concept proposed by Baumgarten (Kant, 2007, B35, annotation 180, p. 89).

In short, the references that allow us to unravel the *bussilis*, going to a remote past of accumulated knowledge is nothing more than looking for the authentic metanarratives that Lyotard referred to (Lyotard, 1984). The thinkers, who appeared out of the growth of the global village, are those who have fomented the histories that have been *a posteriori* justifying the Enlightened Heritage, on which we base most of our needs in order to project a *progressive*, but not regressive or *decadent*, transition into a *becoming* of transformations.

My thesis, therefore, has begun from an evolutionary analysis, which reveals the true history of art, as I outlined in the previous sections, of which I must conclude that art is universal. In continuation, I will examine the nature of beauty, which is the foundation of all art and prove that art is also a necessity.

A Beautiful Seduction

Artifact and enaction

Artifact is that which is fabricated, made and produced in the form of art. This word, artifact, comes from the Latin words *ars* and *factus*, meaning made with art. From this Latin root comes the idea of linking art to making. Ancient art was closely linked to manufacture; the ancient Greeks had the word *techne*, which was later understood in the West as *ars*, showing how more important the method or technique was in the making of art, rather than the object itself. The *techne* is the skill and the virtuosity, free from the embedded content. Larry Shiner, wrote an interesting book which explains the relationship between art and

handicraft (Shiner, 2004). In German, the origin of the word *kunst* is also related to the idea of making or creating, although its roots are not derived from the Latin *ars* or from the Greek *techne*. There are few people who would not find it pleasurable to see someone make a tool, which at the same time could be used as an implement to resolve a problem, and whose function could somehow be embodied by its shape. When the contents are added to the *artifact*, this is when its *thingness* acquires the modern sense of art.

Gombrich demonstrated this, after analysing the sense of order in ornamentation (Gombrich, 1999), objects of beauty, which had no embedded content. However most thinkers rejected this notion, because they expected that some piece of knowledge should emerge from the essence of the art.

However there is a flaw to this idea of no mean importance. The art is also expressed by its own making, like a song well sung, therefore it could not have a relationship with the *artifact*, because in the act of singing there is nothing tangible, not to mention a performance of art where an artistic action is occurring, but which leaves no register of its occurrence. I must also mention enaction in the sense of the performance of an actor; the expression “enaction” is also used in neuroscience to describe a means by which we acquire knowledge. (Varela, 1988, *Enacción: una*

alternativa ante la representación, p. 87. Varela, 1991, *Definición del enfoque enactivo*, p. 238. Varela 2000, *Enacción y cognición*, p. 447).

Theodor Adorno said that subjectivity is a necessary condition of a work of art (Adorno, 2004, p. 227), an idea I share, but would like to clarify. Indeed, a work of art is a "form that contains", more precisely, a "form that can contain," but if I separate the form from that content, I notice that the form is sustained by an immanence, a structure of something that makes sense but which cannot be specified; therefore the form becomes necessarily subjective and is apparent to us in the proximity of our contact with the work of art.

Music is probably the most subjective art form; it has that Apollonian sense of drunken rapture (Nietzsche, 2002, Ch. 5). Consider, for example, the waltz "The Blue Danube", which in its time, brought out fond feelings about the scenic beauty and ecological benefits produced by the River Danube in its course, especially as it passed through Vienna. Just a century later, one could hear those same harmonies as one looked at the Earth from inside a spaceship that Man had managed to construct as a consequence of its evolutionary progress since the pre-Mystic Village Neanderthals, as the film "2001: A Space Odyssey" shows.

The form was the same, but in a different age, with different people and with different symbolism.




Figure 1. Stanley Kubrick, in the film “*2001: Space Odyssey*” used the waltz “The Blue Danube” to express something completely different to what Richard Strauss had conceived a century before, as he extolled the river which crosses through Vienna. This is to show the extreme subjectivity of music.

With art expect anything, because within its genesis is intuition and we cannot imagine intuition nor can we make inferences from it. One can only think

about the concepts, but concepts are not ambiguous or much less subjective, therefore art as a means of presenting this intuition differs in the depths of its being with the knowledge obtained from the concepts. Given that a work can contain and that content contained only as symbols, then we can think about the work of art in terms of its concepts, which are in turn contained in its symbols, or in other words within the container: the form.

Within Art, as a phenomenon, the container as form is intuitively the subject, but this does depend on how much it provokes as the object of empirical experience. The phenomenon of intuition by the senses experiencing it in a particular way, I call *significant immanence*. To talk about this phenomenon, I will put aside any content of embedded symbols and I will analyse the work of art as we perceive it in its immediacy.

The Significant Immanence

I have a thing here that to date has not been ascertained with enough certainty as to view it as a fundament of art.

The problem begins with the following doubt: When the mind recognises an object as a work of art, which mental phenomenon recognises it as

beautiful? So far all that is known is that it arises as an intuition, but how does beauty manifest itself and what is it, before we can use it to explain art? Does it have necessity and is it universal? These are the questions I will try to answer now.

Intuition arises from environmental stimuli that reach us through our sensitive cells (eyes, hearing, smell, etc.) and our ability to organise these stimuli within space and time⁷

If, for example, we see an apple, along with the visual, olfactory and tactile stimuli, we associate it with a space, a space where we have situated it in the schema that we have of a total exterior space, placing it so that various concepts of the phenomenon can be arranged, as Kant says. But that specific space the apple uses, is not the apple's space; if we eat the apple, that space is no longer there nor does it pass through our stomach wrinkled or torn, further still, there is no way to imagine the space of an object if we previously had not perceived the object.

When a mime moves his hands around a telephone that is not present, and he takes it and uses it to

⁷ Kant expresses it in terms of matter, corresponding to the external phenomena which he calls "form" given *a priori* by the subject, not to be confused with the container, the form of a work of art.



Figure 2. When we eat an apple, we don't swallow its space and neither does its space stay outside. Objects do not have their own space; however we intuit that space in our minds in order to understand where things are in Nature with respect to ourselves.

make a mimed call, he induces us to imagine an object within a specific space, which is always dependant on the imagined telephone object. There is an interaction between the mime and the audience by means of an act of apprehension; in fact the mime does not manipulate the telephone space, but the imagined telephone and the space is created by us (spectators of the representation) as a memory of a telephone that uses that space and seems to be occupying a space which also forms part of the mime and whose space we are also part of, the whole exterior spatial schema. We are not thinking of a telephone, but we bring the idea of "telephoneness", as the mime stimulates us with movements that seem to form around the

periphery of the object; so what we are imagining is the story that the mime is developing around that object.

The operation of associating a space *a priori* to an object which is not actually there, requires the act of looking for the stimuli and rebuilding them, i.e. it is a process and not an instantaneous action; there is a moment of understanding that is the basis of all subject-object interactions. Then, the intuited object is integrated into our space-time. For this reason, it is not enough that the mime puts his hands around an imagined telephone, but he must outline it and use it as if were there, in order to reproduce the act of recognising the object matter within the space, which is part of the act of mime, of which he is also a part.

Indeed, this recognition might be fruitful or not, hence I can say that there is an act of apprehension involved, and therefore *significant immanence* is not just a phenomenon of art, but the phenomenon of perception in general.

Any line that we see in the real world leads us to associate it within a space. Three separate lines, joined at their ends, not lying one above the other, form a triangle to which we will associate a triangle space. Then we can think of the space between these three lines. Also, we associate a space with any straight line or curve; we sense it and we can think things like what is this line and how does it relate to

other lines? How have their transformations occurred?

Something similar happens with time: the passing, simultaneity or permanence of the observed objects forces us to guess a time and reconcile it with the schema of a total external time, but the object itself has no time. If we are distracted watching the flight of a fly that revolves around an imaginary axis, we sense that it flies in a circle because it appears to us as if a line emerges from the movement of the fly in the air and in time at a regular distance from the imaginary centre. The circle and the contingency of its emergence and fading are facts that we have intuited by adding space and time *a priori* from our subject-observer situation, but neither the circle as space nor the time associated with the transformations, belong to the pirouettes of the fly. In his fly world he would see another space-time, which I think we could not imagine. Any object which is given to us, whether simple or very complex, we eagerly search for its Kantian form, in terms of space and time, in order to integrate it into our being⁸.

⁸ We can also apply the categories of quantity, quality, relationship and modality to objects, in order to isolate the object from the non-objects and from those other objects that make up the chaos of stimuli, which I will discuss later on.

By means of which process in our consciousness do we visualise these operations? We have a faculty that allows us to synthesise the diverse, unite the seemingly chaotic scattered parts as one individuality, in a way that makes sense to us. Kant called this ability *transcendental apperception*. On the other hand, neuroscience has been actively seeking to resolve the so called *binding problem*⁹ in order to discover how the mind works when the individual identifies an object.

We can not intuit something without associating a space and time to it *a priori* and giving it a sense of unity and, importantly, the mind must develop a process to support this form *a priori* and thus lead to intuition. The question that arises is whether the search for the form can be hard work or complicated or even if it can be unpleasant. In my opinion it can be a hard work; as some simple optical experiments have demonstrated this, as in "(Louis) Necker's Cube" or the "Duck-Rabbit" by Joseph Jastrow.

This demonstrates that the brain takes a while to bring together the stimuli caused by a phenomenon that we observe with a given object in space and time.

⁹ You can find a detailed description in the essay of Patricia Kitcher (Kitcher, 1990).

I suppose that it is a process of trial and error until a space-time can be eventually associated with the phenomena of experience or to put it another way, until Kantian form can contribute to these phenomena.

We are aware of when we perceive these stimuli that are produced by things that exist outside of us. These stimuli come from a multitude of objects, since we cannot isolate an object from nature, and observe it as a separate entity so that we receive only the phenomena and the stimuli, that come directly from it. In other words, the object appears to us from behind a cloud of phenomena and stimuli originating from other objects in which we are not interested which yet appear to us without any order or sequence that might allow us to tell which is which or what particular stimulus belongs to which object; however, both our senses and our minds are organised in a way so that they can pay attention to a select group of stimuli.

For example, in a square there could be hundreds of people talking all at once and yet we could be able to tell what one person in particular might be saying. So I can say that we can perceive the immanence of things; but to grasp this uniqueness, we must carry out a process that ends in the form of a triad of space, time and immanence, a synthetic unification (*synthetische Einheit*); and therefore, it does not seem reasonable to think that we have in our mind an infinite number of patterns that allow

us to match them with the chaos of stimuli and then deduce that there is just one thing. This is especially true when one thinks of things one had never perceived before. However, there is no doubt that we do. We perceive things that we do not know and things that do not necessarily exist and that the only guarantee of their presence (not necessarily their physical existence) is their integrity, examples being freedom, the horoscope, the ether, dragons, the Abominable Snowman and many others, for which we would not be able to have patterns of reference.

The perception of this immanence is necessary because in our contact with nature we are exposed, like all animals, to innumerable dangers posed by objects that we would not necessarily know about *a priori*, so that this ability of the nervous system to give it the power to lucubrate about the unknown, is a guarantee of survival. The discovery of immanence is thus pleasing and provides a significant benefit, since it is the basis for creating hypothetical future scenarios, which as human beings, we often do.

As I said, not all groups of stimuli correspond to real objects, which is why I talk about hypothetical future scenarios. We intuit objects in terms of transformations as they develop or happen in time, during which time we contribute the phenomena. Indeed, time and as well as space, are not parts of the object we observe, time and space are provided

by the observer. Our vision of the future implies a risk, when we realise that many of our perceptions are not actually necessary or immediately useful. It is necessary to keep in mind that immanence belongs as much to the object as the perceptual properties or capacities of the subject. That is, the complete perceived phenomenon is not solely and uniquely the object. And therefore it is reasonable to expect that not just any subject will be able to perceive it as it requires the biological elements necessary for recognition, therefore, it is natural that this immanence does not belong just to the object, but is an integral part of the phenomenon of perception by the subject ¹⁰. Some individuals may not perceive the phenomena and stimuli of a given object. Our perception allows us to refer our intuitions to objects, but this can also be misleading as the phenomena could lead us to recognise an object that does not exist. I will demonstrate this with the following example: for us it is very natural that we see the sun "as if" it rotated every day around our Earth; Wittgenstein's question is: how would it be if we were observing the earth "if it

¹⁰ Kant conditions the possibility of intuition to the faculties that we humans have of perceiving it, but he does not include the biological elements of human nature in his analysis.

looked as if” it was rotating around the sun?¹¹ We have no answers because the phenomenon is misleading us¹².

A judgement can only use concepts, not intuition, but if you heard a musical chord, you might exclaim “how beautiful!” making a judgement this time that is apparently derived from an intuition. However the chord, at this stage, is still an intuition, not a concept. My idea of beauty is any event that produces an aesthetic pleasure, and so is manifested in the person as an emotion, in other words, a neurophysiological reaction. So in hearing the chord, I receive an immanence and it will affect my body, and even if it is completely empty of symbolism and purpose, it will affect my body and I will feel it as mental and physical reaction. Therefore, that pleasing reaction is to me conceptual, and refers to something that I can describe, and as it is agreeable, I am allowed to pronounce a judgement: how beautiful!

Now it is true that Kant conditions judgement to taste, not to the judgement of intuitions, which

¹¹ This was the question which was posed to him by his disciple, Elizabeth Anscombe. (Anscombe, 1963, p. 151).

¹² With respect to the earth as the substrate to which we refer, Husserl made a detailed analysis, which proved that this phenomenon tends to lead to errors in perception (Husserl, 2006).

would have been equivalent to an aesthetic judgement, but he referred to sensations. Let us remember that Kant did not share Baumgarten's idea of aesthetics. For Kant, the judgement is disinterested, which means, it would be intolerable to him to accept that the equation $E = mc^2$ may hold any beauty, because it has a functional utility; or to digress a little, there would be no beauty in any passage in the Tao Te Ching, which for me contains as much philosophical truth as may have the poetry of Hölderlin.

Beauty as fundamental of art

From the above one can understand why and what things awaken a sense of beauty in humans, now I will use this idea to reflect about what art is.

One is born with a representation of blank space and time, although not a *tabula rasa*, in which we then start to fill with experiences and later, as Kant says, allocate categories to the experiences to create order and so accumulate concepts, which we use to think with.

The universe is full of diverse stimuli and we order them in our mind in order to find out about it and move around within it. We have a mental faculty that allows us to effect this unification, which gives meaning to the chaos of stimuli, to feed ourselves, find partners and protect ourselves against

predators. Not only this, we must also subsume the Kantian form to our own body and learn to interact with it in the environment (*umwelt*) based on the representation with which we conform ourselves¹³. The biological theory of Uexküll is also based on a supposition similar to this (Uexküll, 1926).

Living beings are connected to the environment through a number of sensitive cells. For example, a bat knows its surroundings through its ultrasound sensitive ears. This method of perceiving its surroundings seems as precarious as the process by which we determine that the Earth revolves around the sun, or that magnetism exists or that there exist black holes millions of kilometres away.

Homo sapiens is a dominant species however it does not have many more sensitive cells than a bat, so we should also admit that our way of perceiving is equally as precarious. It is clear that humans are differentiated from more primitive animals by their ability to explore and adapt themselves to almost any environment. This ability is related to their ability to perceive hypothetical future scenarios.

¹² The study of perception made by Merleau-Ponty is clear that "the corporeal schema theory is implicitly a theory of perception" (Merleau-Ponty p. 238).

The species conserves this ability. Humans teach their offspring very early on and, in very dramatic ways, that they must learn to visualise the consequences of their future actions, but they do not teach them how to do it; they themselves do not know how it happens, and so for almost everyone, one simply perceives it.

Something in the mind adapts itself using the precarious stimuli collected by the nervous system.

The question is how do these future actions "occur to us" or how, in some unknown way, are they imagined; but we do visualise something that is about to happen in the future. Sebeok and Sebeok wrote a wonderful book that presents the possibility of taking decisions based on intuitions that we have not previously been made aware of (Sebeok, 1984).

I argue that this happens because the human forms knowledge in his mind through this perception of conformations of stimuli immanent to a whole that appears to have some meaning.

The language that is projected in the mime performance cited earlier is an example of this.

The perception of this immanence triggers pleasurable feelings, which induces the species to make them increasingly more useful to interact with their environment, but not only when humans have a problem interacting with their environment,

but also when there is no problem at all, so I suggest that there is an interested and a disinterested form. They are visions of things that seem to make sense, but at first you do not know what sense they make. They are like the essence of something unknown, which being unknown, cannot be categorised. So the thing perceived, the representation of which forms part of the inner self, belongs to the individuals of the species, but it is not real for other individuals, because at that moment it is a *becoming* of their minds, not an observable fact and when they attempt to share their experience with others, it's like looking for the entelechy of something, something unknown, and it seems to make sense and they will seek that sense by consensus. The artist or the scientist sees the primordial entity and the audience sees the play performed.

There is a consensus when a group of people (*populus*) assert that the world is flat or when a scientific academy studies the behaviour of the magnetic field in the ether (today we have reached the consensus that the Earth is not flat and the ether does not exist). There is a consensus but it is not working with objective knowledge, I mean, knowledge that does not possess a logical necessity. The sense can only be achieved definitively through repeated interaction, which can then establish it as formal knowledge.

Significant Immanence or synthetic unification leads to the formation of intuitions, which in turn leads to concepts, which can be thought. They might be interested or disinterested intuitions. I would say they are interested if there is a need due to difficulties in adapting to the environment. For example, if we take a burning stick from a fire and hit it on a rock to put out the flame, marks will be left on the rock, and seeing them we will intuit that these lines mean something. In this case, our intuition would be disinterested. In nature there are phenomena that are significant according to each species. In the case of humans, actions that can open paths to the unknown seem to be overrun by significance.

I find that there are three kinds of intuitions. The first has to do with formal knowledge. Some significant immanence can cause an association of concepts in humans, and we can think about the concepts in relation to others and set up another object to form a more complex concept. This immanence appears in the mind in the form of intuitions and definitively leads to judgements. The imagined concepts could then be converted into knowledge by thinking of them in relation to other concepts that explain phenomena, through recurring interactions, about which we all agree on, which effectively explain the phenomena (the world as a flat surface). It may be emergent like a line of ants, which is made up of ants walking where there is no real line, and there will be nothing to observe

once the ants have moved on. Intuition and the subsequent concepts can lead to the formalisation of knowledge like heliocentrism, $E=mc^2$, economic recession, the genome, etc.

My examples are rather abstract, not like the case of a tree; we can point a finger at a tree and a formal concept would not be necessary as it is enough just to look at it and translate that empirical experience to a symbol: the word “tree”. For the abstract examples I used, their validity is in question, and hence they are things that we can explore mentally and they would correspond basically to synthetic judgements. We could talk about the day when the universe began and whether it is conical or shaped like a rugby ball. Remember that different humans, or rather I should say, different independent cultures, with different versions of the Enlightened Heritage, have imagined themselves as the entire universe and have come to know and describe this concept with much vehemence, just as it still is conceived today in the West.

The second form of intuition is strictly related to humans’ difficulties in adapting to their environment. As we know, humans like to transform their environment to make them feel secure and to meet their needs. This form of intuition generates sets of cause and effect ties or links between known objects of nature and the difficulties of adaptation, so that solutions are

generated and tools are invented to resolve the difficulties. One of the most interesting examples is that of the ordinary lightbulb used to illuminate a dark room. One tends to think that technology will have an instantaneous reply to each problem that arises, just like an equation which provides numerical results where the unknowns are replaced by numerical values. But it is not quick and easy as there is a heuristic process, which an apt subject applies, where one has to visualise a significant immanence in a chaos of phenomena until an appropriate intuition is triggered to give rise to a hitherto nonexistent object. There are many examples of objects which have arisen from the minds of humans, who have struggled to overcome the problems of adaptation to their natural surroundings: for example the lightbulb, the deodorant stick, the aeroplane, UNIX, etc.

Finally, the third form of intuition is definitely disinterested. The example of the burning stick that is put out on a rock and creating a mark is clear enough. When one looks at the mark and imagines seeing things as if they were there, even if it seems like a memory, it opens up a very large number of possible ways to have intuitions. Is this the origin of drawing and could it be the precursor of the painting (as art). A stone, which is sculpted for the purpose of turning it into a tool, is one step away from giving rise to intuitions about objects in the same way it happens with the mark made with charcoal. But the art of sculpting lies in visualising

objects in space, i.e., the space has to be provided *a priori*. Thus, examples of disinterested intuitions are: drawing, sculpture, music, product styling, geometry, etc. Needless to say, this third way corresponds to art, with the exception of geometry, which corresponds to synthetic judgements.

So when do we experience beauty? It is not when we develop an aesthetic judgement, since the pleasure reaction occurs in relation to intuition but judgement refers to concepts. And intuition is only realised when we manage to create the form *a priori*, i.e., in space, time and immanence. It is this which, in my opinion, produces the aesthetic pleasure that I have dealt with here and then we can aspire to develop a concept that can be experienced by others.

As living beings, we live in a universe full of chaotic stimuli. Many of these stimuli come from phenomena that can be dangerous, so a beneficial option for a species, would consist of perceiving sets of phenomena that are marked appropriately to form hypothetical future scenarios. On the other hand, a species that explores in order to find new environments is faced with deciphering signs about unknown phenomena. This is what has occurred with humans since before they settled in the Mystic Villages. One way to engage in these circumstances is by means of a faculty of perceiving the immanence or to attempt a synthetic unification, i.e., find the unity in a seemingly chaotic set of

parts. While the perception of the immanence of objects scattered in chaos, it is a universal and necessary phenomenon, wise people show this ability in an outstanding way and we like to describe their observations as beautiful. The artists have this ability also and they express it through marvellous works of art.

Ontogenesis is the process by which beings undergo a transformation from the embryonic stages to become a mature adult. Within this process they become integrated within a schema of space-time and the Kantian categories, meaning that all objects have rules applied to them in order to differentiate them (quantity, quality, relationships and modality) in such a way that these objects represented in the schema, coincide with what the beings find in their contact with the environment. Part of this integration we do through recurrent interaction with other individuals, while the process of filling this space-time and its categories is essentially a personal experience. It follows that the construction of hypothetical future scenarios provides us with individual advantages, which in turn implies that we try to make ourselves out as special¹⁴.

¹⁴ Although my analysis is completely different, I agree with Ellen Dissanayake, who determined the human behaviour that she referred to as "making special".

From the above it follows that we try to mark or imprint everything we do. This statement helps to explain all of the diverse forms of art.

Perception uses the body as the means (a Merleau-Pontian concept) and in our process of ontogenesis we have:

- 1) *The ability to perceive signifiers with which to build our space-time and the categories of experiences.*
- 2) *The ability as a receiver and sender of signifiers with our environment and our fellow humans.*

For now, there are two consequences that I will expose which are *ludic action* and *symbolic animality*.

With the ludic action, it is worth noting that since the body is a means of finding signifiers, a need arises to play active games, which also occurs with most primitive animals for similar reasons. The purpose is to learn through trial and error with the whole body how to be in contact with the environment, making it a pleasant experience, as well as accumulating knowledge.

On the other hand, we try to translate our space-time schemata and its categories to the domain of recurring interactions with our colony, as a means of exchanging signifiers.

This generates the domain of symbols, as Cassirer defined human and animal symbolism.

Since it is a concept, defined by a knowledge that is in the form of recurrent interactions, art requires the acceptance of an *interest group* that celebrates and adopts it as significant. This interest group consists of associated individuals that share a common set of values or beliefs. This was the case, as an example, of the fine arts in Europe, from the 16th to the 19th centuries. With respect to the concept of this interest group, there are other contingent theories, for example, Jean Cassou, who writes of “official art” (Cassou, 1961, Chap. I), and George Dickie with his “institutional” theory, etc. (Dickie, 1969).

Art refers to objects that produce a pleasurable emotional reaction.

The observation of art is pleasurable; it isn't possible to have art that frightens you. It is beneficial to be perceptive of its significant immanence. Only pleasure can justify the passion that has always been stimulated by art. It is pleasurable to apprehend a unitary whole from the chaos of stimuli (*synthetische Einheit*). According to this unified theory of beauty, art is not hedonic pleasure, but a response to its “eidetic” understanding i.e. the immanence of things, which inspires an emotion to which the observer associates beauty and from which comes art, science and the

manufacture of tools. As I said before, art is disinterested, therefore it should be expected that the artist is not searching for a specific thing just before he perceives the immanence that will become a work of art, an oil painting for example. So he works for a while and then he eventually finishes an artifact or an “enactive” process. This artifact would be the object, the thing itself, which corresponds to the sensation that the artist had envisioned in his mind of the primary object and, to all appearances, the same sensation he originally felt is then reproduced by other people, who can see the work.

Many might object to this argument by saying that many artists start without a clear idea in their minds and their artistic endeavours develop in a process of trial and error. Well, if this is so, it would be inadmissible if the result was just mere chance, and we must accept that the artist perceives the immanence at least when he nears completion of the work. Michelangelo used to say that he perceived the sculpture in the marble block before he started to sculpt. It would be like saying that a pure space was formed in his mind *a priori*, since the Kantian object did not yet exist. This paradox of Michelangelo, occurs because the artist can never know the thing itself that is the origin of the work, and so there is a dialogue with the materials used, as Pareyson exposed in his *Theory of Formativity*, the primordial object may never have existed, but

the sensation that produces the work of art, evokes an underlying order or is subsumed in the work.

If art refers to objects that produce a pleasurable emotional reaction, then it is possible they may have been created unintentionally by random clusters in nature, but they could also have been created intentionally by living beings, especially human beings and so on seeing them and identifying with them as one's own, this art we know so much about and about which we keep returning to, is originated in and presents itself in two complementary forms:

- 1) *Collections of these same objects and*
- 2) *The skills and experience needed to produce them by the subject's action.*

Collections can be diverse, depending on the interest groups.

Any form of art does not owe its existence to itself (*per se*), as if it had a spontaneous birth, but to the collection of beautiful objects and to the ability and actions of people, therefore, art owes its existence to the container of beauty and the need for it. On the other hand, art does not exist to satisfy its own existence, as a purpose in itself (the so-called "art for art's sake"), but to satisfy the need of the beauty contained within. So as a result, I would say that we must abandon the idea that "fine art" or "modern art" or any other way of producing works of art,

exists by itself (*per se*) nor for itself (its own purpose). At the same time I would like to point out that, if the classic story of human spirit defined by Kant as “the life-giving principle of the soul” (*belebende Prinzip im Gemüte*) (Kant, 2007B, §49) that has created all these wonders, among which would be art, were to exist as an entity, then it would be the result of the interaction of humans with their environment.

The idea of a unified theory of beauty is completely valid because art, scientific discovery and manufacture of tools, all require the same eidetic understanding. The primary impulses arise from the space-time-immanence triad, given *a priori* by the subject. My concept of beauty and hence art lies in the universality of the human emotional response to convert all its activities and imprint all its actions. So art is a kind of game and a kind of symbol and all that which allows us to grasp the significant immanence.

One can make judgements about the concepts of art, but not the primordial object that gives rise to the works of art. Sometimes it is easy to talk about the Cinquecento Paintings, as an example and speculate about it and go suddenly into contradictions or paradoxes, because we confuse the concepts that are contained in these paintings, with the essences of the primordial objects that are being represented. Someone may say, "I found the works of Bosch frightening" referring to the

concepts that are represented, but not the immanence of all the pictorial elements from which it is constituted. From these concepts we can always make judgements. For example, Bosch's works show the fear that people in the Middle Ages had of being observed and punished by God. But we can never make these judgements about the immanence, of the Kantian form of these paintings, the intuition of the work of art.

The subject gives beauty to the object. Thus it follows that the beauty of a painting, does not depend, necessarily, on whether it was made by a person, that is, art does not have a necessity for a human origin. This ensures the possibility of a unified art and rules out any intellectual origin. The example of the nightingale is a good illustration (Kant, 2007b, §42). It says that if you go into the woods and hear a nightingale, you will feel enchanted and would go back to listen to it, but if you then were to discover that rather than a nightingale it was a person using a device that sounds like one, you would no longer find it beautiful. My interpretation is that in order to fulfill the significant immanence, the imagination has to know about the existence of the nightingale, as it could not have been observed, if the sound had come from a device. The woods were beautiful *with* the imagined nightingale, but the immanence is broken when it is discovered that it was a person with a device that sounded like a nightingale; the woods would lose their integrity and one should

reasonably expect that the woods would have been beautiful if there had been a nightingale.

Finis

The Limits

If you know what art is and how it arises, and that it is universal and necessary, then it is possible to reflect on the idea of its death, and although it seems a ridiculous idea, it does suggest some very relevant aspects.

First of all I will try to set limits within which we could find some presumed evidence of death, framing some concepts that are implicit in what is and what is not, of being and nothingness, of art and nothingness and the meaning of the death of art.

Just as Kant was the legislator of reason, Hegel emerged as the legislator of art, but was weaker in clearly making rules about what beauty was, and so

it is necessary to explain what art is and about its existence.

He stated which things fell into the realm of art; he also discovered certain categories in which they occur, allowing one to organise works of art: Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry (Epic, Lyric, Drama) (Hegel, 1908, Volume II). A few years later came the film industry. In their efforts to form the idea of film and materialise it, filmmakers started to develop the art form to do it, then filmmaking began to change from being an industry to being an art form and so it entered the sphere of art categories.

If, therefore, art is understood within a regulated materiality, then it is fair to ask whether beauty lies in the medium. Michelangelo took everything that was superfluous from the marble, revealing the *Pietà* inside, which sounds like a good myth. Keep in mind that the work of art exists within the medium that contains it and which gives it form in space-time: a container.

With respect to the container, there is a beautiful account by Heidegger referring to the thingness of a jar (Heidegger, 2001, "The thing"). The jar is also a container; it is like the envelope, that which is superimposed, that which is immediately visible, the packaging of something else that we can relate to, like the wine, or water that is put into it. However, the jar also pours and contains air, but

this last does not *essence*¹⁵. As an aside, the air is not of interest to us. Of course, the air is also contained as part of the essence of the jar, or rather it is part of its functionality; science can understand and characterise it, but we do not do anything with it yet the air enters and leaves the jar without us realising it, but for human use, the jar pours and so connects us; it essences in the connection. As I read this, I was reminded of Claude Levi-Strauss' concept of the raw and the cooked. As these concepts (raw and cooked) are not genetic, humans, at some point in history, referred to cooked food and had to have referred to the concepts of "raw", "cooking", etc. which they needed in order to essence the "cooked". The jar, in terms of its materiality, consists of its sides and base, which hold in things, but it does not just hold in anything, certainly not air, but wine and water and other liquids, such as anointing oil for a ceremony. I would say the *mythos* is also connected to the jar's holding-in sense, by its essence or reality as a container.

Let us return to the realm of art, to those containers, which include those works of art (paintings, sculptures, etc.) that are fixed by a specific materiality.

¹⁵ **Translator's Note:** Heidegger coined a verb from the German word *Wesen*, which also does not exist as a verb in English or Spanish, which means *possession of something essential*.

These works have a container, the *recipiens*, which will be made visible when the artist intuitively finds it. Therefore, this parcel, this *recipiens* is wrapped with a visible and obvious exterior, the *super*, like an envelope (i.e. that which the postman sees). This contains a clear description of the sender, but, somehow in a hidden way, it is not just any container with just any content as taught by Hegel. It is not the same as wrapping, packing and sealing, for they are not niches in a mortuary, nor are they graves. They are envelopes, carriers of letters, notes, cards, invitations or scrolls, which in turn, are inscribed with signs (the message, if you like). It should be noted that the “scroll” or message carrier, does not bear the truth, or at least not necessarily, but what it does necessarily bear is the *mythos*, the message consisting of signs (the notification). It could be bringing the *mythos* of Pergamon, for example, and be at first unintelligible, and so would require some hermeneutic deciphering to try to unleash its meaning.

In the same way that I defend the idea of an empty jar that is placed in the centre of the table as if it were just waiting, not containing or pouring anything, I also defend the idea of a blank letter, i.e. one which does not have any signs on it, but is itself the sign, as if it is telling us: I am not saying anything, it is for you to explain why.

If it were as Hegel explained, then there would have been several envelopes for putting the letters in, and in his case, there would have been just five, since he did not have envelopes for dance or film. And art, as a *corlieu* system, that carries and transports the knowledge of art, like the *mythos*, must be trumpeted out to everyone everywhere, so that they can hear about this knowledge, and can clearly see the envelope, the exterior *super*. The semiotic content, however, that which is embedded within the envelope will still have to be deciphered if you are the recipient and if you can open the envelope. If it were the myth of Pergamon, you would have to read it in ancient Greek, etc.

Therefore, the question is: how can the letter be made invisible, yet at the same time, having the exterior visible (the envelope)? How can the purveyed myth inside be made invisible, while ensuring that the *recipiens* is still visible? It is necessary for the content to be made invisible within the packaging, so that the *corlieu* can carry it. This distinction is crucial because neither part has a common *thingness*: what is seen with the naked eye is the means for carrying the content and the content is itself a sign of something. Therefore, at first glance the visible part, like a work of art, referring to the visible part that carries the meaning, has a contingent connection, as does the jar with the anointing oil, but not an existential dependency.

Consequently, you cannot have an envelope *a priori* for a particular category of letters, just as there can be no medium *a priori* for any specific type of art, because that would mean that beauty, and the *locus bellus*, the place of beauty, would be located within the medium, which would be a serious mistake. The fact that the artist maintains a "search dialogue" with the medium and ends up by discovering a combination of that medium with his own intuition, means that in some way he gives a category of necessity *a priori* to that specific medium for the art. It is simply an "enactive process", the Pareysonian formativity. If the Moon could paint, lunar art would be the eighth art; but the moon itself is not necessary for art, as has been seen in the course of tens of centuries.

In this way, I disconnect the medium from the art and I discard it, because it has no necessity. I do not accept just five, six or seven forms of art, *a priori*, but an indefinite number. Therefore, you have to remove the partition, the barrier that limits art form to specific media, so that the whole discipline of art is the source of beauty.

Hegel thought that a painting in all its detail should not be completely and absolutely representative of reality. If it were so, it would become prosaic (as Hegel dictated his lecture on Aesthetics, Daguerre was preparing his invention that was the precursor of photography), since it was necessary to ensure that the observer perceived the beauty in the work's

fabricated or unreal form. However the artist would not go to the point of deformation, which would have been grotesque. For that reason, he appreciated the paintings of Murillo with its infinite detail, for example, the dark light, unreal ochre, or the form and position of the characters that clearly deviate from reality, so that if you took it out of the frame, the painting could not be confused with reality. Hegel emphasised that perfection with the perspective (the purpose of the painting cannot be the same as a photograph or 3D cinema). However, he stressed that one had to be careful not to confuse the imitation of images with the truth and the whole problem with the antidotes that would be required to access that truth through that confusing veil, which is so characteristic of art. For this reason, Hegel surely believed in that limited perfection, to preserve what is inside the frame of the painting from what is outside of it.

Going in the opposite direction, it is necessary to find out about the semiology, with respect to the symptoms of decadence, if they existed. Cases are repeatedly being found even as long ago as with the case of the Greek poet and singer, Archilochus. Nietzsche thought he might have been the first subjective artist, noting that his works deviated from what was then the essence of art (Nietzsche, 2002, ch. 5, p. 82). In this way, a consciousness appears, coming from within the art, which is why its form of being is examined rather than its production. For Hegel, art is a power that provides

ideas; there was a tacit acceptance of this, and so there was no room for discussion. It is significant to consider that these conceptions came from the European Enlightenment and for this same reason, this belief prevailed for a long time. In the eyes of Nietzsche and Heidegger (Heidegger, 2002) however, Hegel and others were reluctant to accept pure subjectivity in art or an art completely devoid of symbols, as can be found in modern abstract art. Music without words, however, seems intrinsically subjective, as is all the art that Kandinsky initiated. Some idea of truth in the work of art is expected, but a truth that is opposite to the subjectivity, resulting in the deprivation of one degree of freedom necessary for the art. This partition, this barrier, had to be removed because it limited the freedom of art.

In order to close this frame of ideas, I must emphasise some aspects that I consider essential about these limits, which are based on my conception of beauty that I expounded earlier. The first of all is the beauty as a cause of excitement, i.e. the emotional reaction. If beauty does not lie in the medium, then it is something that is *given to* the medium.

Consequently, the symbolic content is neither in the beauty nor in the medium.

So we need to distinguish and separate these ideas, because what is in the frame or container, i.e. that

which is placed inside the envelope, is not the thing itself. It is not knowable, because, as we know, in art we have only intuitions, not concepts, so we cannot work with them.

It is also necessary to recognise that art always has an interest group, those people who created the works of art, those who supported their *becoming* and all those who appreciated them for posterity. This concept coincides with George Dickie's institutional idea of art. My conception is simple and universal: art is for all groups of people, ever since the dawn of humankind.

Finally, it should be noted that content is placed within containers that are appropriate to the technology of the time. Therefore, one should not imagine there is any type of barrier that would prevent technology from providing new forms of art.

Theoretical announcements of art's death and actual pronouncements of its destruction have appeared, but which of them have illegally crossed the existential limits of art and have contaminated pure ideas with inexplicable contingencies?

Transfiguration *In extremis*

So far, the idea of death is not sufficiently convincing. Many thinkers have proclaimed states

of death, but not only in art but in many different facets of human history.

Indeed, in general human history, there have been many signs of death and transfiguration and this has been repeated progressively even to this day.

I will review some cases. In my view, the death of art is part of a persistent pessimism that many thinkers have exhorted since the disappearance of the mystical villages. It is like an instinctive reaction to any structural change that we are slow to adapt to. Perhaps it is not so strange that someone may not feel comfortable in this world (it is clear that I mean people in general). For a long time, thinkers have questioned some of the fundamentals of the Enlightened Heritage. Hegel, with respect to an idea that was current in his intellectual milieu, was at pains to admit that: "*Gott ist gestorben*", God is dead (Hegel, 1983, 435).

Schopenhauer also admitted this idea about the death of God. Human relationships within the Mystical-Imperial States, found a breaking point with the consciousness of freedom and for his part, Hegel and later Marx, announced the death of history and, more recently, Vattimo announced the death of metaphysics and the death of modernity (Vattimo, 1987).

However, what else can you expect in a world without mystical thinking and rampant disbelief?

With respect to art, according to Vattimo, the last "herald" was Marcuse (Vattimo, 1987, p. 50), while with Marx, there was an attempt to take the meaning of art and cross the limit with economics, disconnecting any subjectivity, depriving it of its essence and confusing its reason of being.

The Soviet theorist Nikolai Tarabukin during the emergence of Soviet culture, contributed to the idea by stating: "The art of the future is not going to be sweet candy, but a transformation of work." Moreover, he coincided with Spengler, because both were trying to connect art to economic factors (Tarabukin, 1978, p. 54 and 58), and as such, he hoped art would be evaluated by its productivity.

These ideas are closely related to the metaphysical concept of *progress*, which fits well with the accounts they provide to support the economy and its "truth", especially with those of Marx. So the Mystic-Imperial State was forced to find the link between the economy, especially the free market, its philosophy, and a necessary sense of progress, without which the economy would be meaningless. Regarding the conception of progress, Croce makes this interesting observation:

"The difficulty is in the very concept of a '*progressus ad finitum*', a *becoming* that has a temporal beginning and end and once it has reached its end, is not subject to any reason to be able to support its new beginning; in short,

a *becoming* without need of logic (which supposes a moment of irrationality)" ¹⁶

(Croce, 1906, pp.199-200).

For Vattimo, "Modernity can be characterized as a phenomenon dominated by the idea of the history of thought, understood as a progressive 'enlightenment' " (Vattimo, 1987, p. 10).

While the philosophy of economics acquired body and soul, John Ruskin and William Morris, English artists and thinkers of the nineteenth century, dreamed of returning to the Mystic Village. However, they could not find a solution, although they did try to change the problem: they produced an art that could not be justified during that age of industrialisation, and this resulted in a revolt against industrialism.

Marinetti, at the opposite pole, lambasts Ruskin:

"...with his sickly dream of a wild and primitive life, with his nostalgia for Homeric cheeses and legendary spinning wheels, with his hatred of the machine, of steam and electricity, this maniac, who dreams of age-old simplicity, makes us think of a man who, after having exhausted his full corporeal maturity

¹⁶ The observation in parenthesis is Croce's.

and already decrepit, would like to sleep in his crib and suck at his nurse's breast, so that he might regain his childhood innocence."

(Marinetti, 1978, Ch. III, p. 48).

Ruskin made important studies on architecture and painting, which showed that art, in the fifteenth century, had reached its state of greatest connectedness with humanity.

Probably the most famous proclaimer of the death of art was Croce, in his effort to refute his mistaken interpretation of Hegel's announcement of its death. The announcement of the transfiguration of art proposed by Hegel was interpreted by Benedetto Croce as a death notice. However, we should clarify that Croce, believing it was an announcement of death (which is false), he himself rejected it as false. In effect, he believed that Hegel had announced the death of art, which he did not share, but his mistaken understanding of Hegel's meaning, put the issue in doubt for a long time. Croce held that to relate art to religion and philosophy was a problematic idea in the sense that art could resolve problems of knowledge, in a way that religion and philosophy could not or at least would find it difficult to do so.

Therefore, Croce concluded that Hegel saw himself as obligated to accept (tacitly) that:

"Artistic activity is distinct from philosophy by only a minor degree of perfection, as it seeks the Absolute, in a sensitive and immediate way, while philosophy apprehends it in the pure element of thought."

(Croce, 1906)

In my view, this is extremely reductionist, leaving aside the intuitive value of art which in turn makes it subjective, it is the same doctrine that supports Croce's own theory of art; whereby, art and philosophy (or religion), do not compete in the search for some idea of truth, but are alternative paths. Still, Croce arrived at the conclusion that art and philosophy in Hegel's thoughts are not essentially different, and, whether Hegel liked it or not, art would be reduced to a "philosophical error, an inferior philosophy" (Croce, 1906, p. 116).

He makes the following statement (it is hard to find his evidence in the literature) that Hegel never denied the consequences that erupted from this theory; and so tacitly confirmed the idea that "art should disappear," as it would be obviously superfluous, and must inevitably die. Croce added, "...because it is a mistake."

As can be seen, Croce did not base this assumption on the famous historic phrase that art was past, but he inferred that in reducing art, philosophy and religion unnecessarily, Hegel, implied that the need for art had disappeared. Therefore, it can be seen

that these ideas of Croce, were extremely controversial; but he himself wrote, a few years later, using the ambivalent Italian expression, "fine" (end) instead of "morte" (death).

It is incredible that even at the end of the twentieth century the controversy should be reopened, even though various thinkers on the subject (Gadamer among others) had already clarified the remaining doubts, and several very pain-staking studies like that of Dino Formaggio existed. Therefore, after the conclusions of these eminent thinkers, the rebirth of the thesis on the death of art should have been unthinkable.

However, a German author, Hans Belting and a North American, Arthur Danto recently reopened the controversy on the death of art. Belting called his book "*Das Ende der Kunstgeschichte?*" In the first edition the title is in the form of a question and in a later edition, the title (in English) is an affirmation: "The End of Art History."

In what follows I will refer only to Danto, who goes further, by announcing the death of Art itself, not just art history, as does his colleague. Firstly, he comments about it in an essay and then later in a book entitled "After the End of Art", making some clarifications of his remarks.

It is worth mentioning again the ambivalence of the word "end" which can mean both finish and

purpose. The original essay, "The end of art", is especially ambiguous, as the "end" could mean purpose; it is also the same in German. However the end of a film is announced by the familiar phrase: "The end" (which shouldn't mean the film will disintegrate) and the public can leave, because there is nothing more to see, unless they then want to see another show, but in Spanish it would simply say "Fin" as saying, the act has finished, but the film didn't die.

As you can see, *fin*, *fine*, *Ende* and *end* therefore refer to the extreme of something sequential, while *muerte*, *morte*, *Vernichtung*, and *death* allude to an existential question: to be or not to be, whose opposites may be: *vida*, *vita*, *Dasein* and *life*.

This analysis could be seen to be completely trivial; however it would be striking to see a book entitled "The Death of Art" with a lead article proclaiming "The end of art", and this in fact proved to be a messy and confusing approach.

In 1984, Danto published the essay with the "curious thesis" whose "vaguely formulated idea" ¹⁷ he revised and published in 1997 with a title, which complicated the meaning further: "After the End of Art", and therefore revived the whole exhausted

¹⁷ Arthur Danto's own expressions

issue about the death of art. He described something like the promised heaven of art (post death) about what will happen after it dies. The thesis of the book must have a certain validity beyond its intentions, which should be in its logic and not in its rhetoric, as it is the only way to form knowledge.

Danto argues that if Belting wrote something about "*before the beginning of art*" then one can deduce that "*we should think of art after its end*".

Here then he refers to art as an entity, not as a phenomenon, as it can die, hence the titles of the books of these thinkers.

These authors deposit the meaning of existence in the 'Story' or grand narrative, a Lyotardian idea, an issue that would be contained in what I call the Enlightened Heritage. The thinker Noël Carroll dismissed Danto's idea saying it was inconsistent, as it presents ideas that contradict each other (Carroll, 1997).

The thinker Leon Rosenstein also thought Danto's idea unfounded because it gave necessary conditions but not enough to define a work of art, making the art inexplicable and he felt the death concept was meaningless (Rosenstein, 2002). Marketing a product meets the same conditions as that which Danto had proposed:

- i) *It refers to something*
- ii) *The form embodies what it means.*

It is a good definition of the Greek *techne* as it excludes the *enactment*. Danto needed the concept of (Lyotardian) legitimising narratives to enable the death-resurrection, which he invented, as the theory, that he called the "theory of the art world", or the "art world theory", which he himself had proposed a few years earlier, was no longer useful, arguing that *interest groups* existed, that legitimised or accredited works as their own. For his part, Rosenstein affirmed that it is not art that is dead, but theories about art and so the appearance of a new philosophy was needed to produce a new theory. So what is the discussion really all about? It is the *transformability* of art or the kind of death with successive births of other arts. It is not one species of art, of just one entity, but distinct entities that nevertheless get mixed up and link up forming a causality between them, since the nature of the disintegration of one allows the next to be born; and rarely, with its own ontogeny.

All who have looked at different possibilities of death agree that art survives *in extremis*, as artists continue to emerge and continue to produce new and wonderful forms of art even though the theorists fail to find an explanation. Although it seems ridiculous, we are in the same place: nothing is dead, it has just transformed.

Consciousness as a Power of Transfiguration

Paradoxically, the transfiguration of the arts has led to the assumption that there is a death of art itself. The transfiguration occurs due to the kind of consciousness that emerges from the making of the art, which leads artists to examine again and again different ways of producing it.

Dino Formaggio defined this idea like this:

"...dialectic death of certain signs of consciousness, within artistic aesthetic performances, and hence their perennial transmutations and regenerations within the progressive consciousness".

(Formaggio, 1992).

It has been the driving force behind most of the changes of form within art.

Vasari, a Renaissance thinker, put the artist as the protagonist of things to come. The North American critic Clement Greenberg imagined post-Vasarian history as a manifestation of self-examination. It is a very interesting idea, but according to a study by Nietzsche, at least in the case of Archilochus, he showed that the phenomenon is much older.

The concept of consciousness was also touched on by Heidegger, when he was asked why he chose Hölderlin to be his example of the essence of

poetry (Heidegger, 2002, p. 128). Many thinkers expect to find some secret logical knowledge, and this was the trap into which Croce fell, as he assumed that art must bring knowledge and therefore he thought he had found an error in Hegel's thinking. Heidegger, as he searched for his ideal poet, chose Hölderlin, because of his common sense and clarity in the content of his poetry, in a way that lyrical poetry (or like abstract art that appeared many years later), cannot provide. In other words, he chose Hölderlin because his poetry is not subjective and his art does not converge on to an abstract object, but to knowledge. Therefore, it can be read with clarity. It is like saying that it is translatable, which is very dangerous as a doctrine.

Heidegger enframed all that would be essential, as the essence of the essential in poetry (this was another of his puns). He wanted to be within the same frame and saw Hölderlin as "the poet's poet", an interesting vision of what I consider the act of consciousness from within art: the artist is looking to make the classic work of art, rather than a finished beautiful object. That would be in my view the basic steps toward a deep and methodical development of the enaction of art.

With respect to this, it is necessary to outline Heidegger's concerns. He asked himself whether this idealisation of the poet was not too late, "an end," he says, in other words, a fear, a persistent pessimism about death that kept reappearing.

Then Heidegger becomes ambiguous or indecisive on the issue of death and in these words of doubt, he says:

"Maybe the experience of art is the element that dies".

(Heidegger, 2002).

The consciousness of the making of art, that which appears in the artist's mind, was exteriorised ever more dramatically by the late nineteenth century, turning into a whirl of controversy. In 1909, in Paris, when a group of artists exhibited paintings with thick brush strokes and exaggeratedly bright colours, an art critic, who saw a Donatello in the same place, ironically said: why is this beauty surrounded by all these beasts (*fauves*)? It is curious that Donatello was used as an example of such a supposedly delicate piece, if the expression is permitted. Donatello was another *fauve*, when he, late in life, began to create unfinished works, although it is possible this was because he was very old, however as a myth it is most illustrating. Michelangelo was convinced that it was not strictly necessary to finalise the polishing stage completely. Some parts of the sculpture should not be completed because, he thought, observers would then be able, on the one hand, to understand the deep meaning of the object and on the other, to recreate, in some way in their minds, the final piece that had not been completely finished. In short, this technique, arising out of consciousness, became

increasingly important and came to be called *non-finito*.

The “voluntary forgetfulness of the artists’ craft” corresponds to this trend of abandonment of their craft or skills. Some centuries later, a group of painters were eager to represent ephemeral effects of light that ran away behind the mountains during swift and furtive sunsets. They began to experiment with new forms of painting, voluntarily abandoning their skills, as they were enthusiastic to paint these rapidly occurring facets of nature. This was their “voluntary forgetfulness of their craft” as they became carried away by their unorthodox (for that time at least) brushstrokes.

The list is long. Marcel Duchamp, after years of work on his work "The Large Glass," said (with a hint of irony) that he would leave it how it is, since according to him, it had reached its state of *final unfinishedness*. However, he left a large number of writings, sketches, experiments and additional creations that ultimately formed an integral part of the work.

Consciousness in art occurred in all disciplines. In the case of music, to name just one, Gyorgy Ligueti, wrote some music devoid of tonality, harmony and rhythm. It is a mass of sounds that change their texture and evoke atmospheres.

The cases cited above, are elements of art that departed from the canons that were trying to encapsulate it in a vain perfection that was unnecessary for artistic expression.

In 1921, Tarabukin presented a dissertation entitled "The Last Picture Has Been Painted", in which he referred to three Rodchenko paintings, each with one single colour: one red, one yellow and the last, blue. Referring to the red painting, Tarabukin made the following comment:

"This canvas is extremely significant for the evolution of artistic forms which art has undergone in the last ten years. It is not merely a stage which can be followed by new ones but it represents the last and final step of a long journey, the last word, after which painting must become silent, the last 'picture' made by an artist. This canvas eloquently demonstrates that painting as a figurative art -which it has always been- is outdated. If Malevich's Black Square on a White Background, despite the poverty of its artistic meaning, did contain some painterly idea which the author called 'economy', 'the fifth dimension', then Rodchenko's canvas, which is devoid of any content, is a meaningless, dumb and blind wall".

(Tarabukin, 1977, p. 46)

In the early nineteenth century, when industrialisation was in full swing, almost all consumer products were manufactured in large quantities, which produced the economic effect of lowering their cost of production but on the other hand, the image of the object took on an almost symbolic sense. Marcel Duchamp, in 1914, used one of these products, a bottle dryer and took it to an art exhibition as a sculpture. After he installed it, under the suggestive name of "*Bottle Dryer*", he had deprived the object of its chrematistic value to become a disinterested symbol, being a different thing and having a different *thingness*. However, so that this structure might make sense, the observer necessarily had to be aware of its transfiguration, associating both the existence of the product within the economy and its arrangement at the art exhibition. If someone did not know that this iron structure was a bottle drier, he would not comprehend the meaning of it as a work of art, as he would not be able to disrupt or rebuild his space-time around its utilitarian purpose (the meaning lies in the purpose and the symbolism).

The other major transformation occurred when artists abandoned their fidelity to their art medium. For example, artists stopped painting with oils or sculpting in stone and decided to assemble their work using different bits and pieces, as did Duchamp.

Therefore, with each art medium contradictions can be shown and this resulted in formal changes; for example, when an artist wondered whether it would not be possible to have an art devoid of symbols, this developed into what is now known as abstract art.

One would probably have to accept that these contradictions with the media are not infinite and that some day artists will stop using their medium, but they, as creators of art, will simply look for another one. However they are unlikely to say: that's a shame, art has finished, now I suppose I'll have to become a plumber, or something like that.

Enaction as the Power of Transfiguration

If we are talking about dialectical changes, about the relationship of art with specific human behaviour, then I can say that the last major change occurred when art became the *process* rather than the finished work, what I call *enactive art*. This really is a drastic and very deep change.

Art is expressed from and in any form. One form is through exalting the process, the behaviour of the creator, from intuition to the final construct; it is the *praxis*, the method and mode of production, which results in the act of discovery of the immanence.

This whole procedure is a pleasurable experience that the artist tries to convey, with ever increasing intensity to his or her interest group, so that the art, which at first was represented by a beautiful finished object, has rather become the action of producing it, in some cases, to the point of not seeing any beautiful finished object at all.

Hence, I can say that the **process is the art**, or in other words, art is expressed in the enaction that provides knowledge that is borne by symbols, which uses a medium and has a finish and whose immanence is *in the doing*. Moreover, this leads to another aspect of nothingness in art, in that they are works that will not be shown in a museum, and which will not fade. This process is the enaction through which the artist has enabled it to be seen.

So, this awareness has led to great changes in the form of art, because it is another facet of the change that is visible these days as circumstantial form and never before has a clear theory like this been proposed to explain it.

This is similar to the *formativity* theory proposed by Luigi Pareyson, which I find particularly attractive because of how he characterised the "*organism*". He associated it with the need for a consistency in the significant interactions humans have with the biosphere that they want to decipher. Uexküll's theory of these interactions is that of a "musical harmony" and that this demands a

constant effort to understand the signs. Adorno presupposed that the work of art gets to be art by being itself and is in a finished state by its own existence. However, he adds: "*There is now an incipient doubt about this*" (Adorno, 2004, p. 239), given that in the final decades of his life, the enactive expressions of art began to make their appearance.

Postfacio

To end: this book will not disintegrate, just because we reach the end of the text, unless, of course, the reader prefers to incinerate or shred it. Even if they did, my ideas could not be so easily destroyed. Moreover, other books will come forth, maybe not my own, but some of them may be digital, others might be shouted out aloud, as in the novel "Fahrenheit 451", but others will come, and this means of spreading the myths will never die.

Similarly, far from death and nothingness, art is the lifeblood that is everything that we humans do.

The Story of Art, which has never been written, would detail its *becoming* as I have described in these pages: the phylogenetic experiences that I have related to the Mystic Village, the enlightenment, the meaning of art, the dizzy vertigo that has been provoked by the concept of the death of art; its definitions and its mistakes,

while still showing the works of arts that humans have worshipped in each case.

We would find much meaning in such a Story and the historicity of art would be free from the Monets, Picassos, and Cezannes; it would free itself from Europe, from the Monarchies and the Churches; it could see the world before the fifth century and start really looking at art in the twenty first century. It could refer to what really matters to the historicity of art.

Talking about the death of art is inadmissible for two reasons. The weaker one perhaps, is that of Hegel, the legislator, who never said such a thing. However, his words which were so eloquent about the beautiful works of the past, had produced a myth, which lead to many pages, written by those who assumed an old confused conception, which many saw as the truth: the secret recesses and the divine word. The second reason is powerful and comes from a deeply rooted concept: Beauty, which I have discussed in these pages, that gives us the guarantee that art is universal and necessary and therefore death is integral to the existence of our species.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. (2004) *Teoría Estética*, España: Editorial Akal.

Anscombe, Elizabeth (1963) *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. New York: Harper and Row.

Carroll, N. (1997) Danto's new definition of art and the problem of art theories, *British Journal of Aesthetics*, **37** (4). pp. 386-392.

Cassirer, E. (1968) *Antropología filosófica*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Cassou, J. (1961) *Panorama de las artes plásticas contemporáneas*, Madrid: Guadarrama.

Croce, B. (1906) *Lo vivo y lo muerto de la filosofía de Hegel*, Argentina: Ediciones Imán.

Croce, B. (1969) *Estética*, Argentina: Ediciones Nueva Visión.

Danto, A. C. (2010) *After the end of art*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Danto, A. C. (2010) *Después del fin del arte*, España: Paidós.

Derrida, J. (1998) *Aporías*, España: Paidós Studio.

Derrida, J. (2010) *La verdad en la pintura*, Argentina: Paidós.

Dickie, G. (1969) Defining art, *The American Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (3). pp. 253-256.

Dissanayake E. (1995) *Homo Aestheticus*, USA: University of Washington Press.

Formaggio, D. (1992) *La “Muerte del Arte” y La Estética*, México: Grijarbo.

Gombrich, E. (1999) *El sentido del orden*, Madrid: Debate.

Heidegger, M. (2001) *Conferencias y artículos*, España: Ediciones El Serbal.

Heidegger, M. (2002) *Arte y poesía*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Hegel, G.W.F (1908) *Estética*, Madrid: Daniel Jarro.

Hegel, G.W.F (1975) *Hegels's Aesthetics Lectures on the fine Art*, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F (1983) *Fenomenología del espíritu*, España: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Hegel, G.W.F (2011) *Lecciones sobre la estética*, Madrid: Akal.

Husserl, E. (2006) *La tierra no se mueve*, España: Editorial Complutense.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I. (1970) *Love and Hate*, UK: Methuen and Co. Ltd., University Paperbacks.

Gadamer, H.-G. (2010) *La actualidad de lo bello*, España: Paidós.

Kant, I. (2007 A) *Crítica de la razón pura*, Argentina: Editorial Colihue.

Kant, I. (2007 B) *Crítica del juicio*, España: Austral

Kant, I. (2007 C) *¿Qué es la ilustración?*, España: Alianza Editorial.

Kitcher, Patricia (1990) *Kant's transcendental psychology*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Lao Tzu (1995) *Tao Te Ching*, Translated by Brian Browne Walker. New York: St. Martin's Griffin.

Lao Tse (2004) *Tao Te King*, España: Editorial Sirio.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (1978) *Myth and meaning*, London: Routledge.

Lévi-Strauss, C. (2002) *Lo crudo y lo cocido*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) *The postmodern condition*, USA: University of Minnesota Press.

Marinetti, F.T. (1978), *Manifiestos y textos futuristas*, España: Ediciones del Cotal S.A.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1997) *Fenomenología de la percepción*, España: Editorial Península.

Morris, D. (2004) *El mono desnudo*, España: Ed. Debolsillo.

Nietzsche, F. (2002) *El nacimiento de la tragedia*, España: Edaf S.A.

Ramachandran, V.S. and Hirstein, W. (1999) The science of art, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, **6** (5-6), pp. 15-51.

Renan, E. (2010) *¿Qué es una nación?*, España: Editorial Sequitur.

Rosenstein, Leon (2002) The End of the Art Theory, *Humanitas Journal*, National Humanities Institute, **6**,(1). pp. 32-58.

Sebeok, T. y Sebeok, J. (1984) *Sherlock Holmes y Charles S. Peirce*, España: Paidós.

Shiner, L. (2004) *La invención del arte*, España: Paidós.

Tarabukin, N. (1978) *El último cuadro*, Barcelona: Gustavo Gili.

Varela, F. J. (1988) *Conocer*, España: Gedisa.

Varela, F. J. (1991) *De cuerpo presente*, España: Gedisa.

Varela, F. J. (2000) *El fenómeno de la vida*, Chile: J.C. Sáez Editor.

Vattimo, G. (1987) *El fin de la modernidad*, España: Gedisa.

Von Uexküll, J. (1926) *Theoretical Biology*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.

Von Uexküll, J. (1936) *Ideas para una concepción biológica del mundo*, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe.

ISBN: 978-956-351-138-3



9 789563 511383



ASKdossier.com